cording to Aristotle, is supposed to bd the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itself is devoid of. Moreover, Aristotle co^clucles^ that they, who assign only a material cause, as^ sign no cause at all *rov* su *KO!* /caXwc, of well and fit, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is ascribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philosopher,[11] that *j <t>vmg* /uaXXov ap/i? Kai *curia rriq* vXi?e> nature is more a principle and cause than matter;—and therefore it cannot be one and the same thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that Aristotle's nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripatetics seem to conceive, these being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is such a * thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cause of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies, to be one and the self-same thing, is all one, as if one should make the seal (with the stamper too) to be one and the same thing with the signature upon the wax. And, lastly, Aristotle's nature can least of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; because these act only in virtue of their substance, neither can they exercise any active power over the substance itself in which they are; whereas the plastic nature is a thing that domineers over the substance of the whole corporeal universe, and which, sub-qrdinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore,

* Metapbys. lib. i, cap. iii, p. 266. torn, iv. oper. »> De Partib. Animal, lib. i. cap. i. p. 475. torn. ii. oper. Vide etiam Pbysieor, lib. ii. cap. i. p. 462.